[10] I urge you on behalf of my child Onesimus, whose father I have become in my imprisonment, [11] who was once useless to you but is now useful to (both) you and me. [12] I am sending him, that is, my own heart, back to you. [13] I should have liked to retain him for myself, so that he might serve me on your behalf in my imprisonment for the gospel, [14] but I did not want to do anything without your consent, so that the good you do might not be forced but voluntary.
(CCC 1734) Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis enhance the mastery of the will over its acts. (CCC 1735) Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors. (CCC 1736) Every act directly willed is imputable to its author: Thus the Lord asked Eve after the sin in the garden: "What is this that you have done?" (Gen 3:13). He asked Cain the same question (Cf. Gen 4:10). The prophet Nathan questioned David in the same way after he committed adultery with the wife of Uriah and had him murdered (Cf. 2 Sam 12:7-15). An action can be indirectly voluntary when it results from negligence regarding something one should have known or done: for example, an accident arising from ignorance of traffic laws. (CCC 1737) An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
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